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The first sentence of Rupert Read’s challenging and original paper (Read 2017) 
acknowledges that the greenhouse gases we’ve already unleashed commit us to grave new 
natural disasters, while in the concluding sentence he hopes that we may collectively wake up 
before we have committed our civilisation to breakdown.  
 
Between these positions there need be no contradiction, provided that the inescapable new 
disasters don’t amount, just so far, to breakdown. But then, when he writes of climate chaos, 
and of the prospective deaths of tens or even hundreds of millions, this logically crucial gap 
seems to narrow; and when he accepts that, in order to re-empower a lost sense of community 
cohesion, such disasters “need to be big enough to not leave an…intact social system”, it is in 
danger of vanishing. So perhaps, and maybe without consciously intending to, Read is 
presenting us here with an argument which has certainly been made before – as, for instance, 
also unintentionally, by Clive Hamilton (2010) – to the effect that, if we can only admit 
anthropogenic climate chaos to be now inevitable, we may still at this eleventh hour spur 
ourselves into avoiding it. And that is, of course, (however temptingly) to contradict oneself. 
 
I will return to this possibility, because it may account for things in the paper which 
otherwise I find inexplicable. Even if that were his underlying strategy, however, it wouldn’t 
much detract from the power, passion and forthrightness with which Read actually confronts 
oncoming disaster. Rather than shirk it as unthinkable, the reaction of so many who offer to 
think about this, he tries to see beyond it to its deeper human meaning and to the anti-
Hobbesian (as he hopes) values of altruism, mutual support and renewed social responsibility 
which it might help us retrieve. 
 
This is admirable and vitally necessary work. I think he accepts too easily that the values 
which this transformative experience could reawaken in us would be familiar ones which we 
could readily recognise and welcome, and this goes, in my view, with his not fully admitting 
the genuinely tragic nature of our plight. (All the disasters for which he cites analyses from 
the intriguing field of Disaster Studies were, or were perceived by their sufferers as, inflicted 
from without, by accident or enemies; climate disaster, on the other hand, we shall have 
brought wholly on ourselves, through destructive flaws inherent in great human strengths 
which Enlightenment rationality and technical creativity have deployed.) But I have engaged 
directly with Read on this matter in my own paper for this Special Issue, so will say no more 
about it here. Whichever of us is right, this part of his piece remains strong, cogent – and 
inspiring. 
 
What I do want to address critically in this response is the argument in his Section 3, where, 
accepting that retrieved community must mean a greatly intensified concentration on survival 
in our local and particular circumstances, he nevertheless tries to find in this a new kind of 
impulse towards the universalism of protecting future generations for their own sake. This 
move turns on the claim that, if we care profoundly for our (actual or imaginary) children, as 
surely out of mere humanity we most of us do, then we must care profoundly for what they 
will care profoundly about – that is, in turn, their own children, for whom our transferred 
profound care will then again commit us to caring profoundly for their children – and so the 
caring relation iterates transitively onwards until we are caring, as profoundly as we care for 
our own children, for the n
th
 generation of our descendants multiplying incalculably across 
the Earth. Ordinary parental care is thus “enough to unleash a care that encompasses the 
entire human future time-wise and the entire globe space-wise”.  
 
Now I entirely agree, and have contended in my own work (which Read references in 
generous terms) that our standardly-alleged liberal-contractual obligations of responsibility 
towards future generations amount only to a delusive shadow-stewardship; while sounding 
impressive (from a distance), these pseudo-obligations will never effectively constrain us 
from present actions grievously harmful to the interests of future people. This alternative 
argument for stewardship, however, doesn’t take us ad infinitum, as Read explicitly claims, 
but – surely – ad absurdum. I do care, and profoundly, about my actual, living children. I 
don’t, though, give a hoot whether or not homo sapiens as such, never mind my own 
descendants, will be around on the planet in 21,000 AD, nor, I very strongly suspect, do most 
of my readers in respect of their descendants. So the conclusion that reason compels us all to 
give vastly more than a hoot must be a reductio. 
 
Read (in conversation) has argued that my not giving a hoot is a case of unjustified pure time 
preference, which should be overridden by ethical considerations. And for sure, if I bury 
(say) an unmarked canister of plutonium in my garden, I ought to feel just as worried about 
its potential effects on someone chancing to dig it up in twenty thousand years, as in twenty – 
here, my clear responsibility for future harm does seem to render the time-lapse irrelevant. 
But I could lead an ecologically blameless life, so that no action of mine did anything except 
increase the chances of humans being still around in 21,000 AD, and still not give a hoot about 
whether or not they were. My profound concern might be (as indeed it is) to avoid 
impoverishing biospheric life by my actions in the single lifetime which I have available, and 
might bear no relation at all to any envisaged distant-future state of the planet. For Read this 
would make me either unethical (despite my ecological virtues) in not caring properly for my 
children, or irrational. Since I take myself to be obviously (at least in this regard) neither, 
again that conclusion must stand as a reductio.  
 
As such, it must show something to be amiss with the argument as set out. The problem 
seems to be with the hypothetical major premise. Where this goes wrong, I take it, is in the 
supposed transitivity of “profound caring”. If I care thus for my children, I don’t necessarily 
care profoundly for people or objects about which they care profoundly, although I will (and 
perhaps by definition), in caring for my children, care profoundly that they care thus about 
whatever it is – so that I won’t, for instance, mock or demean it nor as far as possible 
interfere with it, and if it is as near-future as a grandchild I will very probably also cherish it, 
for their and for its own sake. But over just one generation, my caring has already, as it were, 
taken a step back, and this seems wholly natural. Care, like concern and even interest, just 
fades as the generations flow on away from us. And well for us that it does – caring 
profoundly for one’s own children, with all the joy, stress and anguish which go to fill the 
package, is quite exacting enough for one human life. Read’s argument would require, by 
contrast, that we also feel the full intensity of parental concern for our grandchildren and 
great-grandchildren (to go no further), for whom actually and quite properly we feel only 
grandparental and (if we get there) great-grand-parental concern – and nth-great-
grandparental concern, on that trajectory, will have long become wholly indistinguishable 
from complete indifference. That, luckily, is how we are. 
 
How could so acute a philosopher as Read have come up with so strange an argument? I can 
only surmise him to have been drawn, perhaps subconsciously, to the strategy on which I 
remarked above – that of having the cake of honesty about inevitable climate chaos while 
nourishing oneself on the unextinguished option of last-minute avoidance. So we confront 
oncoming disaster by seeing through it to retrievable community, the renewed local focus of 
which must be made to unleash the kind of commitment to protecting the future by which 
disaster might even yet be forestalled. This is maybe impertinent speculation. But no small 
part of our inherently tragic human nature is our habitual yearning after such impossibilities.  
 
For all that, Read’s instinct about these issues and their human significance seems to me to 
point, compellingly, in the right direction. The values we already have, or some painfully-
winnowed version of them, are indeed enough if we can come home again to acting on them. 
We shall not learn what may be learnable from this oncoming disaster unless we come to 
recognise in practice what we have all along deeply known, that deliberately trashing the 
ecological bases for continuing human and other life on Earth, however (way beyond our 
capacity to know or care) the consequences pan out, robs our lives here in the present of 
kinds of meaning which we can’t do without, either for our own flourishing or for that of 
people for whom we do genuinely care profoundly. If climate tragedy teaches us that lesson, 
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